The U.S. and Iran are shooting again, the second (and larger) flare up since they signed a Memorandum of Understanding in June.

The main point of contention is the Strait of Hormuz, a vital waterway for international trade that Iran blocked in response to the initial U.S.-Israel attack in February. The MOU reflects U.S. desperation to get ships flowing again, giving Iran economic benefits in exchange for Iran merely promising to “make arrangements … for the safe passage of commercial vessels,” without specifying what those arrangements are. Iran has consistently asserted it will control Hormuz and charge fees for passage, while the U.S., especially President Donald Trump, has been acting as if the strait is totally open and on a fast track back to prewar normal.

Except it clearly isn’t. More ships went through after the MOU, but even at peak it was fewer than half the daily prewar average. They avoided the middle of the strait, fearing mines, and Iran told them to travel by Iranian coastal waters and register with a new “Persian Gulf Strait Authority.” The U.S., for its part, encouraged ships to bypass Iran by hugging Oman’s coast on the opposite side. Iran shot at some shipsnear Oman to assert control, the U.S. shot at Iran to contest it, then back-and-forth retaliation followed.

The fight could escalate or settle down again, but the underlying problem remains: a large gap between (1) the facts on the ground and the text of the MOU, and (2) the fantasy in Trump’s imagination. The U.S. government has been warped by an effort to pretend Trump’s make-believe is real, making peace impossible.

The U.S. lost the war Trump started, failing to…

Read the full article for free in MS.NOW: https://www.ms.now/opinion/trump-iran-strikes-mou-strait-hormuz

Over the weekend, less than two weeks after Iran and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding to end hostilities, the countries exchanged multiple attacks. Iran fired at a ship crossing the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. shot at Iranian missile and drone sites, then both sides launched more strikes while claiming retaliation for the other violating the ceasefire. A meeting between the two countries was called off, though the White House now says there will be new meetings in Qatar.

This isn’t a return to full-scale war, but it isn’t peace either. It is a new phase in the conflict: the fight to control Hormuz. The United States already lost the fight Trump started; it failed to achieve his declared goal of the Iranian regime’s unconditional surrender, or, barring that, Tehran’s acceptance of stringent nuclear restrictions. Now the conflict is over whether Iran controls Hormuz and can charge fees, or if the U.S. can restore the pre-war status quo, with ships transiting freely.

The two sides are making incompatible claims about the MOU’s contents. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said that under the agreement, Iran has sole responsibility for the strait. Meanwhile, the Trump administration asserts that the U.S. will not allow Iran to “illegally control an international waterway.”

The MOU itself is ambiguous enough to allow for either interpretation. But that’s the problem: this core issue was never worked out. The MOU was…

Read the full article for free at MS.NOW here: https://www.ms.now/opinion/us-iran-war-strait-hormuz-strikes

Only a few days after the United States and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding, Iran announced that the Strait of Hormuz was closed again. But it wasn’t American forces that drew the sharp response from Tehran. Instead, the Iranians said Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon meant America violated the deal. Neither Israel nor Hezbollah are party to the MOU, but the “immediate and permanent termination” of their conflict in Lebanon is listed as a condition in the document’s first article.

Professional diplomats would have insisted on more specificity about what that language meant. It’s unlikely seasoned American negotiators would have agreed without getting Israeli buy-in first, but the Trump regime disdains that sort of expertise. This disregard for detail fits President Donald Trump’s consistent approach to conflict diplomacy: seek the minimum that can be called a “peace deal,” punting on core issues and excluding conflict participants as needed. Produce something that’s more vision than plan and proclaim peace. Public praise and positive press will follow. Actual follow-through will not.

A closer examination of the MOU shows how predictable it was that Lebanon would become a sticking point. A ceasefire…

Read the full article for free in MS.NOW: https://www.ms.now/opinion/trump-iran-agreement-israel-lebanon

The United States and Iran say they reached a “memorandum of understanding” (MOU) to end the current war and work towards a more comprehensive agreement, but hesitated to release the language to the public. The U.S. also reportedly refused to show the text to the Israeli government, America’s partner in launching the war. Logical inference says that’s because the MOU favors Iran, the Trump White House knows it, and they don’t want to hear criticism, including from more hawkish Republicans.

One U.S. official tried preemptively dismissing the text, telling CNN White House correspondent Alayna Treene that “people shouldn’t read too much into the language of the MOU” because “what’s more important than the actual document is the understandings we have with each other.” But the Iranians almost certainly think the written specifics of the MOU they spent weeks hammering out matter more than things American and Iranian officials might have said to each other off the record. So will regional and world governments.

The text has now leaked, and Trump officials were right to think it makes them look bad. The MOU amounts to U.S. surrender. While the wording might be a little different in the final signed document, in part because it’ll be published in multiple languages, here is the full text as reported by Bloomberg News. Each MOU article is in italics, with my comments below.

1. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States, together with their allies in the current war, declare upon the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding an immediate and permanent end to the war on all fronts, including Lebanon, and undertake that from now on they will not launch any hostile action against each other, and will refrain from the threat or use of force against each other. The final agreement will confirm the articles of this Article and the remaining Articles.

Standard war-ending language when neither side achieved a decisive military victory. Except for one part: “including Lebanon.” The United States is not at war in Lebanon, Israel is. And Israel isn’t a party to the MOU. So the U.S.-Iran agreement depends on the U.S. getting Israel on board, even though the Israelis didn’t participate in the talks.

This gives Israel an opportunity to play spoiler, maintaining or escalating activity in Lebanon to undermine the U.S.-Iran agreement. Though that would risk a breach with the United States, which would be very risky for Israel since many countries are increasingly treating it as a pariah.

But whatever Israel does, including Lebanon in the MOU gives Iran leverage in future talks. The Israelis might scale back military operations, but they’re very unlikely to withdraw from the parts of southern Lebanon they invaded to establish a “buffer zone” with Hezbollah. That means Iran could cite Israel’s actions to scuttle future talks with the United States. Or Iran could strategically ignore Israel’s military activity if they like how negotiations are going.

2. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States undertake to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.

Standard mutual recognition of each other’s sovereignty. Though it’s worth noting that this article, if actually followed, requires more of America than Iran, since the United States has violated Iranian sovereignty considerably more than Iran has violated America’s. (America’s main problems with Iran, such as violation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and ongoing support for terrorism, aren’t about U.S. sovereignty.)

3. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States undertake to negotiate and reach a final agreement within a maximum period of 60 days, extendable by mutual consent.

The U.S. and Iran agree to work towards an agreement. This is effectively an admission of American failure. Trump launched the war calling for regime change and demanding “unconditional surrender,” but the MOU treats the Iranian regime as the legitimate representation of the country, and offers concessions rather than securing anything like surrender.

4. Immediately upon the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding, the United States Lift the naval blockade and prevent any interference or obstruction against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and restore traffic within a maximum of 30 days to its full capacity; the traffic of ships shall be proportional to the pre-war volume of traffic on the part of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States also undertakes to withdraw its forces from the surrounding areas within 30 days after the final agreement.

5. Upon signing this Memorandum of Understanding, the Islamic Republic of Iran will immediately take steps to ensure that the movement of merchant ships from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of ​​Oman and vice versa is resumed within 30 days to the pre-war volume, taking into account the need for the removal of technical obstacles and the neutralization of mines by Iran.

Together, these articles aim to restore maritime traffic, undoing the blockage that’s causing so much damage to the global economy. But note how the demands on America are immediate and concrete (“immediately upon signing… lift the naval blockade”) while the demands on Iran are not (“take steps to ensure that the movement of merchant ships… is resumed”). Article 4, which lifts America’s blockade, doesn’t include language on legitimate reasons for delay, while article 5, which lifts Iran’s block of Hormuz, acknowledges the possibility of “technical obstacles” and mine removal. By not including specifics, that language gives Iran another excuse if they want to use it.

And what does it mean to “withdraw [American] forces from the surrounding areas”? Move warships further away from Hormuz? Close all military bases in and around the Persian Gulf? Something in between?

The ambiguity plays to Iran’s advantage, similar to the language about an “immediate and permanent end” to war in Lebanon. It won’t actually happen, at least not to the full extent, which means Iran will always have an excuse if they want to stall or exit negotiations. For example, they could do something like “hey America, you promised to withdraw forces but these photos show ongoing activity at this base in Saudi Arabia, you broke the deal.”

6. The United States undertakes, together with its regional partners, to create a comprehensive plan agreed upon by both parties for the rehabilitation and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran, While ensuring financing of at least $300 billion. The implementation mechanism of this plan, as part of the final agreement, will be formulated within 60 days.

Iran gets “at least $300 billion.” A main talking point from Trump and other opponents of the JCPOA—the Iran nuclear deal Obama signed in 2015—was that it gave Iran $1.7 billion as part of the price for verified nuclear restrictions. I’m not a banker, but I’m pretty sure $300B is a lot more money than $1.7B.

The MOU specifies $300 billion as the floor for Iran’s foreign-funded reconstruction, but doesn’t call for Iran to do anything to get it. No nuclear restrictions or verification methods here.

That said, the deal doesn’t give this money to Iran immediately, instead specifying that it will be “part of the final agreement.” The carrot of a large reconstruction fund for Iran gives the U.S. potential leverage in future negotiations. But Iran is very unlikely to forfeit their nuclear program in exchange, especially not when Iran’s position is strong enough to get the concessions in this MOU, so a $300B reconstruction fund might never happen.

And if it does, where will the money come from? Trump has tried spinning this as others choosing to “invest” in Iran, claiming that’s better than the U.S. giving money directly to Iran, which implies that non-U.S. countries will fund it. But if he expects Gulf Arab governments to give billions to Iran even as they spend big to rebuild the infrastructure Iran damaged, he’ll likely be disappointed.

7. The United States commits to ending, on a schedule to be agreed upon as part of the final agreement, all types of sanctions currently facing the Islamic Republic of Iran, including resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and all unilateral U.S. sanctions, both primary and secondary.

Major economic benefits for Iran, though it’s left as leverage for future talks involving Iran’s nuclear program, not given immediately. Iran wants sanctions relief, and will at minimum negotiate in pursuit of it. But it’s worth noting that sanctions relief for nuclear restrictions was the core arrangement of the JCPOA, which Trump reneged on without cause, and still denounces.

8. The Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates that it will never produce nuclear weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States have agreed that the fate of enriched material and the fate of all other mutually agreed nuclear-related issues, including Iran’s nuclear needs, will be adequately addressed in a final agreement; the final agreement will confirm the articles of this Article.

Iran has always insisted it will never produce nuclear weapons. Most of the world thinks that’s a lie (hence all the sanctions) but Iran has kept insisting it. So while the Trump regime may try touting this article, it isn’t a concession at all. The MOU even acknowledges this as Iran’s long-running stance with the word “reiterates.”

9. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States agree that, pending a final agreement, they will maintain the status quo: Iran will maintain the status quo on its nuclear program, and the United States will not impose new sanctions on Iran or strengthen its forces in the region.

This is odd language—maybe it sounds clearer in farsi—but it looks like both sides agreed to remain static while talks take place. That means Iran won’t do any additional nuclear enrichment and the U.S. will not deploy more military assets to the region.

10. The United States undertakes that immediately after the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding, and until the date of the lifting of sanctions, the United States Treasury Department will issue waivers for exports of Iranian crude oil, petrochemical products and their derivatives, and all related services, including banking, insurance, transportation, and the like.

This part is clear, and it’s an immediate concession to Iran. Upon signing the MOU, the U.S. issues waivers to allow Iranian economic activity. If the U.S. removes restrictions on Iranian oil exports and gives Iran access to international financial and insurance services, that’s de facto removal of sanctions, at least for a time. Iran does not have to do anything in exchange.

11. The United States undertakes that, in light of the progress of negotiations towards a final agreement, frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran will be released and made fully available. These funds, whether held in the master account or transferred, will be used for any final beneficiary payment determined by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran and will be fully available for use. The United States undertakes to issue all necessary permits and licenses on this basis.

Another economic concession to Iran, the release of frozen funds. This one isn’t immediate like Article 10, but also doesn’t require the U.S. and Iran to reach a larger deal first. The MOU says the U.S. should unfreeze Iran’s funds “in light of the progress of negotiations towards a final agreement,” which sounds like the U.S. paying Iran to participate in talks.

This provision sets up a debate over what constitutes “progress.” Iran can say there’s been progress, demand some of its unfrozen funds, and threaten to exit negotiations if they don’t get it. The U.S. can say there hasn’t been progress, and Iran needs to show more movement to get its money back. That’s potential leverage for either side, though the strategic dynamic and the talks that led to this MOU show the Trump regime as thirstier for a deal than the Iranians, so it’s probably more leverage for Iran.

12. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States agree that an implementation mechanism will be established to oversee the successful implementation of and future commitment to the Final Agreement.

Sure, fine. Third party oversight could help facilitate implementation.

13. Following the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding, and upon receipt of assurances regarding the commencement of implementation of Articles 4, 5, 10, and 11 of this Memorandum of Understanding, and the continued implementation of these steps, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States will enter into negotiations for a Final Agreement solely with respect to the remaining Articles.

Articles 4, 5, 10, and 11 are the ones where the U.S. makes concessions. Iran got American negotiators to accept a text that emphasizes the U.S. immediately lifting its blockade, withdrawing military forces within 30 days, immediately issuing waivers to facilitate Iranian exports, and committing to unfreeze funds during negotiations rather than after a final deal.

Including this language leaves no doubt that the negotiations are on Iran’s terms, and the United States is effectively surrendering.

14. The final agreement will be approved through a binding resolution of the UN Security Council.

Sure, fine. It’s good to have international buy-in.

President Donald Trump announced an imminent agreement to end the Iran war, and while he’s said things like that before, Iranian officials and Pakistani mediators also say there’s a deal, so this time it’s real. The U.S. and Iran are expected to sign something on Friday. But it’s reportedly a “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) that agrees in principle to end hostilities and continue discussing broader issues, not any sort of comprehensive deal. Essentially, American and Iranian negotiators have reached an agreement to work towards negotiating an agreement.

The language isn’t publicly available yet, but the core reported provision is Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz—a narrow passage at the end of the Persian Gulf by which Iran has blocked nearly 20% of the world’s oil and gas supply—and ending the U.S. blockade on Iran, as well as Israel-Hezbollah fighting in Lebanon. We’ll have to see if those things actually happen, but however it goes, the MOU displays remarkably scaled back ambitions.

Trump launched the war at the end of February talking of regime change, calling for the Iranian people to overthrow their government, and demanding “unconditional surrender.” When the initial U.S.-Israeli assault failed to achieve any of that, Trump downshifted to talk of Iran’s nuclear program, repeatedly insisting that Iran will never have nuclear weapons, lying that Iran was on the verge of getting some—which contradicted his previous lie that U.S. bombing last year “completely and totally obliterated” Iran’s nuclear capacity—and accusing war critics of wanting Iran to get the bomb. Now with the new MOU, Trump is touting a deal with de facto recognition of the Iranian regime’s sovereignty that leaves any nuclear discussions to further talks.

That means negotiations to get this MOU have been on Iran’s terms. Instead of…

Read the full article for free at Liberal Currents: https://www.liberalcurrents.com/u-s-and-iran-agree-to-talk-more/

Without political news and social media, I was less angry. I wouldn’t say at peace or unconcerned about the state of the world, but at least less actively pissed off. It didn’t hit me until about two weeks into my now-annual news break, when another driver said something obnoxious at a red light. I was thinking about it a few minutes later, annoyed, when I realized that I’ve been feeling angry nearly all the time about much more important things.

The Information Age deluge of updates, alerts, notifications, and commentary throws everything in your face. Shutting all that out—never checking, not once, for enough days to lose track of events—takes effort, especially at first to break the habit. But each year I’m glad I did.

No breaking news, no doomscrolling, no awareness of what some pundit, politician, or big social media account said. No Trump. Or at least a lot less.

It takes a few days to lose touch with the news, then settles in. Feels more relaxing. Pleasant. And millions of people live like this all the time! I couldn’t, but it’s a nice place to visit.

Anyone directly affected by Trumpian authoritarianism doesn’t have that option. Anybody with a loved one detained by ICE, for example. But if you’re able, I recommend shutting the news out for a bit.

Feeling frustration, anger, or despair about political events doesn’t make anything better on its own. If those feelings motivate you to take more action, great—I participated in protests for the first time—but the negative feelings themselves don’t improve anything. As I wrote after last year’s break: they take so much already, you don’t need to let them take your mental health too.

During my news hiatus, I focused more on my kids, especially during their break between the end of school and the start of camp. This is the time of year when dad never says “we can play later, but now I have to work” or “hang on, I gotta finish writing this.”

Usually on these breaks, I accomplish yardwork and home improvement tasks that have been hanging over me, and while I still did some of that, much of my physical energy this time went to a puppy.

This puppy:

Her name is Hazel. She’s about 10 months old, rambunctious, and adorable. The kids love her and she clearly loves them too.

During these breaks, I like to get absorbed in a fantasy or sci fi book series, a fictional world to care about while I shut out the real one. This year it was Dungeon Crawler Carl. It’s fun, basically “what if people were forced into a bonkers real-life D&D video game,” with elements that reminded me of the Running Man, Critical Role, the Hunger Games, and Ready Player One, though decidedly more adult than the latter two.

The person who recommended it said I should do the audiobook, and it’s great (thanks, sis). I live in the Midwest, both my parents and in-laws are east coast, and my family listens to audiobooks when we drive to visit. Many narrators are good, but Dungeon Crawler Carl’s Jeff Hays is the best I’ve heard. There are so many characters with distinct voices it’s hard to believe they’re all the same actor. And while I bet parts of the books are funny on the page, Hays’ delivery adds to the humor. It’s not a family road trip book, though. Too many parts aren’t appropriate for kids.

Hays’ group Soundbooth Theater adds some audio effects; not so much it’s overwhelming, but enough it enhances the listening experience. Sometimes there’s a noise or music in line with the story. An AI talking over a loudspeaker has a slight mechanical distortion. The powerful monster’s voice reverberates. While my knowledge of audiobooks is far from exhaustive, this is the first I’ve seen it as its own medium, something more than a person reading a book aloud.

It’s a long series, and while I’m not finished, I’ve listened to a lot. This meant extra long walks for the puppy.

This puppy:

More than in previous years, I found it difficult to get away. Newspaper headlines such as “U.S. Strikes Iran” caught my eye in the supermarket, even as I tried to avoid them.

I read the book Greenwild on recommendation from my 10 year old. I love that my kid is so excited about books he wants me to read them. It was pretty good, but it turned out the main character is half Iranian, and references Persian phrases her mother said, which works in the context of the story, and nicely exposes kids to other cultures, but unfortunately made me think about the real world situation I was most trying to ignore.

I closely followed the NBA playoffs, my favorite annual sports event. Even better, the New York Knicks, my favorite team—not just in basketball, in any sport—made a run to the finals.

But Trump insisted on attending game 3 in New York, the first sitting president to go to an NBA finals game. The announcement made headlines on sports media, injecting Trump into information spaces that usually don’t mention him. Security arrangements required attendees to come hours in advance and the Secret Service maintained a noticeable presence throughout. The TV broadcast showed or mentioned the president multiple times.

I was really trying to stick to sports. Politics wouldn’t let me.

On the upside, sports media has seemed terrified to touch anything political in the aftermath of the 2024 election and earlier backlash to athletes and sports media personalities showing solidarity with Black Lives Matter—as if neutral-to-positive about the status quo isn’t political—but the logistics of an NBA finals game are unquestionably a sports story. As annoyed as I was that Trump had forced his way into my news break, it was nice seeing sports commentators criticizing the additional difficulties the president thrust upon a big event that’s already hard to run, and how he worsened the vibe.

The Madison Square Garden crowd booed loudly when the Jumbotron showed Trump during the national anthem. That seemed appropriate. And very New York.

Then the Knicks lost the Trump game, breaking their 13-playoff-game winning streak. When they fell far behind in the next game, I worried that Trump had managed to ruin this too, getting the Knicks to blow a 2-0 series lead, cursing the team forever more. But then, without Trump present, they pulled off the biggest-ever comeback in an NBA finals game, and the next game won the championship.

I choose to interpret this as a metaphor.

The end of the playoffs happened to coincide with the announcement of a U.S.-Iran “memorandum of understanding.” It’s time for me to reengage with current events.

I can take a break, but I can’t check out. Checking out is what authoritarians want you to do. I feel angry about the stupid, damaging war of choice on Iran and the ongoing degradation of American democracy because those are really bad things, causing unnecessary harm to so many people.

I can’t hide from all that. I’ll follow events, seek more information, try to understand what’s happening, and process it with others. I’ll read, listen, talk, write, scroll, and post. Sometimes that will be unpleasant. But at least I’m going through it with all of you.

And this puppy:

I usually take a news and social media break around this time of year, after the spring semester ends. It’s good for me to focus on other things, treat current events as not my problem, and quiet the part of my brain that’s constantly formulating things to write about war and politics. I find that impossible while following the news or interacting online. The break typically goes for about two weeks, and I come back feeling mentally healthier, more ready to engage the mostly-awful news again. Then I write about it (here’s what I wrote about last year’s).

This year I worried I couldn’t. There are multiple important things going on, but in particular the Iran war is a big deal for me, personally and professionally, and I’ve followed developments closely. It’s also very frustrating, because the war was so unnecessary, it’s causing so much damage, and the Trump regime’s strategy is terrible. American government officials, financial markets, and a lot of U.S. media coverage are acting like the war is going well, we’re on the verge of peace, and things will snap back afterwards. I really don’t think they will.

It felt like I couldn’t look away, but there’s a good chance the situation will be in a similarly bad state a few weeks from now. Maybe I’ll miss another cycle of Trump issuing threats, lying that there’s big progress towards a deal, getting frustrated that the Iranians aren’t capitulating, then issuing threats again. We saw a version of that cycle this past week.

I’d be shocked if there’s a real war-ending, Strait of Hormuz-opening deal within the next few weeks, because what Trump broke he cannot fix. The only paths forward are a humiliating surrender or a dangerous escalation. He apparently wants neither, and has kicked the can down the road as pressure mounts.

So I’m going on break. If something big happens, someone will tell me. But otherwise I won’t know. For a bit, at least.

I’ve done a few podcasts recently, on a variety of topics. If you missed any of these, or you’d like to hear from me while I’m on break, check them out:

Neon Liberalism with Samantha Hancox-Li, a Liberal Currents podcast, where we talked about America’s Trump-accelerated decline, a post-American world order, and why China isn’t going to step in as global leader. No one will. No one can.

Listen here: https://www.liberalcurrents.com/after-america-nothing-neon-liberalism-75-with-nicholas-grossman/

To the Contrary with Charlie Sykes, where we talked about Trump’s massive corruption, easily the largest in American history—a ballroom paid for with corporate bribes and taxpayer funds, insider trading that dwarfs any previous examples, an illegal slush fund to reward/encourage cop-beating insurrectionists and other criminals he likes, etc.—along with the midterms, the Iran war, and other topics.

Listen here:

To the Contrary

Trump's Goon Squad Slush Fund

Even by the standards of Trump’s Age of Corruption his $1.8 billion cash grab to pay off his supporters is stunningly crude and brazen. On today’s “To the Contrary,” I’m joined by Nicholas Grossman, editor of Arc Digital and Professor of International Relations at the University of Illinois, to discuss Trump’s descent into new levels of kakistocracy…

Listen now

2 months ago · 66 likes · 17 comments · Charlie Sykes

The Daily Blast with Greg Sargent, a New Republic podcast, where we discuss the Iran war, the unavoidable supply shock, and how it’s become a big political liability for Trump.

Listen here: https://newrepublic.com/article/210409/trump-iran-tirade-visibly-rattles-gopers-leaks-expose-new-blunders

I wish you all the best. See you in a couple weeks.

President Donald Trump visited China, prompting thoughts of a global transition of power. The trip comes amidst America’s ongoing hegemonic suicide, as Trump is creating chaos at home, alienating allies abroad, damaging domestic and international institutions, egregiously violating U.S. and international law, breaking the U.S.-led system of open trade, and trashing U.S. credibilityin ways that will be difficult, perhaps impossible to reverse. Trump is throwing away many of the things that made America the world’s premier power, and as the United States declines, China has the most to gain.

The biggest factor is Trump’s horribly misguided Iran war, an unnecessary act of aggression that casts today’s America as more akin to Putin’s Russia than to Eisenhower, Reagan, or Obama’s United States. In prompting Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz—through which over 100 ships a day carrying oil, natural gas, fertilizer, and other essential commodities flowed freely before the war—and apparently having no idea how to fix the situation, Trump forfeited America’s position as the guarantor of freedom of navigation and global commerce.

Meanwhile, China has been rising—economically, technologically, militarily—and looking to many countries like a more attractive option merely by being consistent compared to the now volatile, unreliable, and combative United States.

On May 13, Trump went to meet Chinese leader Xi Jinping and spoke very positively of him, clearly taken in by Xi’s displays of authoritarian pomp. By contrast, Xi warned of a “Thucydides Trap”—the supposed inevitable conflict between a rising and an established power—and told Trump to stay out of the Taiwan issue. Trump went pursuing concessions on trade and deals for American businesses, and practically begged Xi for help opening the Strait of Hormuz. He got none of that.

Shortly after, Xi is scheduled to host Russian leader Vladimir Putin. The Trump and Putin visits have Xi looking like the most powerful person in the world.

But just because America is declining and China is rising does not mean China is poised to take over as global leader. Instead…

Read the full article for free at Liberal Currents here: https://www.liberalcurrents.com/staggering-towards-anarchy/

President Donald Trump is on an official U.S. state visit to China, and he brought American business leaders in pursuit of deals. One is Trump’s biggest campaign donor Elon Musk, which is very corrupt. Another is Eric Trump, who runs the Trump Organization, a private business owned entirely by Donald Trump and run by his family members. That’s even more corrupt.

Here is how the New York Times covered it:

Could raise questions? Potential blurred lines?

The lines aren’t blurred. There’s no line at all. The president has a massive financial conflict of interest, representing the United States abroad while also seeking personal business deals, trying to generate money that goes into his own pocket. Pretending that his son running the business insulates President Trump from this conflict of interest is absurd. And bringing Eric on an official state visit to China leaves no ambiguity.

But the New York Times, America’s “paper of record,” will not say so. Instead, they couch it in weak euphemisms, noting merely the hypothetical that someone else might ask questions about it.

Contrast that with how the Times covered Hunter Biden, former president Joe Biden’s son. Here is one of many examples:

“Audacious proposal,” directly stated, with no euphemisms, hypotheticals, or attributing the accusation to others.

And that’s for something much less corrupt! Joe Biden never included Hunter on any state visits or official U.S. business at all. This article describes things Hunter did independently while his father was vice president. And it involved a group that included a Chinese company, not the Chinese government itself. Despite extensive investigations, including years from Republican-led Congressional committees, no one has ever produced evidence that Joe Biden was involved, not even a little.

It was reasonable to scrutinize Hunter Biden’s business dealings, and apparent that Hunter tried trading on his father’s name. That’s not good, but it’s relatively mild, akin to past cases involving presidential relatives such as Donald Nixon or Roger Clinton. There shouldn’t be any financial conflicts of interest involving a president’s family, but nothing Joe Biden’s son (or Nixon and Clinton’s brothers) did impacted U.S. policy.

If a vice president’s son trying to drum up personal business in a foreign country using his father’s name without the vice president’s involvement is bad, then the president’s son trying to drum up personal business in a foreign country by joining his father on an official state visit is really, really bad.

I don’t think the New York Times stating the Trumps’ corruption directly will solve the problem or transform politics or even necessarily convince anyone who doesn’t already see Trump as corrupt to change their mind. But I do think such a prominent media organization should hold presidents to the same standard.

I challenge anyone to explain how describing Hunter Biden’s activity as “an audacious proposal” and Eric Trump’s objectively worse activity as “could raise questions about potential blurred lines” is not media bias in Donald Trump’s favor.

Iran responded on Sunday to President Donald Trump’s latest peace proposal with demands of its own. The United States asked Iran to agree in principle to forfeit its nuclear program and reopen the Strait of Hormuz while it negotiates the details. Iran rejected that, asking the U.S. to pay war reparations and acknowledge Iran’s sovereignty over Hormuz, by which Iran is blocking around 20% of the world’s oil and gas supply. With both countries acting like they have the upper hand, a war-ending deal is impossible.

Trump has insisted Iran has been “defeated militarily” and reassured that “as soon as the war is over, which will not be too long, you’re going to see oil prices drop.” Wall Street has appeared similarly confident. For example, JP Morgan’s latest guidance said, by June, oil shortages will “force the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, one way or another … following a clear and credible announcement ratified and confirmed by both sides.”

But no politicians or bankers have explained how this will happen, and their complacent insistence that it will work itself out delays the hard choices necessary to resolve the war. Resource shortages are growing, and…

Read the full article for free at MS.NOW here: https://www.ms.now/opinion/trump-wall-street-iran-war-stalemate

America’s democratic backsliding deepened as the Supreme Court gutted the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in Louisiana v. Callais. The VRA passed Constitutional muster many times, and Congress renewed it in 2006 by large supermajorities, but the John Roberts-led Supreme Court undid it because they personally dislike the outcome, which isn’t their job. Meanwhile, the Virginia state supreme court blocked an amendment to the state constitution that passed by popular referendum, which isn’t really their job, and did so on a technicality that they didn’t apply to the previous Virginia constitutional amendment addressing redistricting. Both decisions boost Republicans’ political power and weaken Democrats’.

The judges wrote up some lawyerly bullshit as rationalization, of course, but I refuse to indulge such obvious bad faith, especially given the larger context of Donald Trump and the Republican Party’s assault on U.S. Constitutional democracy. If you’d like to parse the legal language, or see how the judges denied facts, distorted law, and contradicted themselves, try this or this or this.

Here, in plain language, is what happened:

Republican partisans on the Supreme Court created a pretext to gut the Voting Rights Act so the former Confederate/Jim Crow states, and red states more broadly, could manipulate maps to lock Black Americans and other minorities out of government representation. After the decision, multiple Republican-controlled states rushed to do exactly that. Then Republican partisans on the Virginia state supreme court created a pretext to prevent Virginia Democrats from responding in kind.

Tennessee Republicans carved up Memphis’ Congressional district, putting each piece with enough rural white areas to shut the city’s residents—over 62% Black and overwhelmingly Democratic—out of representation, and make the state’s Congressional delegation exclusively instead of mostly Republican. Louisiana Republicans are stopping primaries where votes have already been cast so they can redraw maps and get an all-Republican delegation, violating the “Purcell Principle” that says there can’t be changes close to an election, which the Supreme Court treated as important when it advantaged Republicans. Florida is moving to redistrict to get Republicans more seats, even though Florida law says they can’t.

All that is being done by governors and state legislatures, some of which are gerrymandered into disproportionate representation themselves. Virginia at least held a referendum to redistrict in Democrats’ favor, which was honestly framed as a response to red states’ redistricting in Republicans’ favor, and won majority support. The red states didn’t bother asking the public.

Virginia’s referendum makes state Democrats’ effort a little more democratic, but it’s still bad for democracy. White rural Virginians deserve representation, same as Black urban Tennesseans.

Except America isn’t a full democracy anymore. Thanks to Donald Trump, the MAGA movement, the Republican Party, and the Roberts Court, with a big assist from right-wing media and tech industry oligarchs, the United States has backslid into competitive authoritarianism. It’s not consolidated authoritarianism like in China, so there are still elections for national office. But the ruling party has abused power to give itself unfair advantages, with recent gerrymandering only one example.

I don’t want the United States to be in this position, but here we are. The available choice to pro-democracy Americans is (1) weakly acquiesce to further democratic backsliding and entrenched one-party rule, or (2) respond in kind to balance out illegitimate Republican power grabs as best as possible.

Ideally, fighting back will convince Republicans it’s in their interest to honor principles of democracy even if they don’t believe in them, and join Democrats in banning gerrymandering for everyone. If not, then countering the power grabs would still reduce Republicans’ illegitimate advantages, increasing the chances pro-democracy forces can gain enough power to enact democratic restoration in 2029.

In that spirit, the Virginia governor and state legislature should follow Louisiana, Tennessee, and Florida, redistricting however they want. They could defend this as the will of the people expressed via referendum, by pointing to the Supreme Court’s recent Callais decision, and/or by rejecting the state court’s bad faith cancellation of a constitutional amendment. Republicans will presumably object, but at least this makes them work to try to stop it. If they manage to, then tweak the wording and pass it again. A more drastic option within the state legislature’s legal authority is to lower the age limit for state supreme court judges from the current 73 to 54, the age of the youngest member of the faction that blocked the amendment.

I’m not necessarily saying they should do these particular moves—take this more as considering possibilities than crafting a detailed plan—nor claiming that anything will definitely work. But Virginia’s Democratic majority, and pro-democracy Americans more broadly, should fight rather than acquiesce, using any nonviolent means they can come up with, and see what happens. Get caught trying instead of forfeiting in advance. The one thing they should not do is accept that anti-democracy Republicans get to play by different, more favorable rules.

A common argument against actions like these is it will prompt Republican retaliation, setting off a downward spiral. But Republicans are already doing everything they can think of to give themselves unfair advantages. They’re already gerrymandering millions of Americans out of representation, already judge-shopping to get partisan ideologues who will distort the law in Republicans’ favor, already violating the Constitution in multiple egregious ways, and already attempted a coup.

When Democrats push back, the most Republicans can do is continue what they’re already doing. Appeasement never dissuades them from that. If anything, it encourages them.

Winning an Unfair Fight

While I think that Democrats and anyone who prefers democracy over authoritarianism should stand up to Republicans’ anti-democracy actions, I’m not panicking over the Virginia decision. It concerns only four Congressional seats—out of 435 in the House—and I stand by the argument I made in February that Trump’s effort to steal the midterms will likely fail. Not because Republicans aren’t trying, or will hold back, but because they lack the capacity. They’re beatable.

Pro-democracy Americans should fight as hard as they can for a fair system while working as best they can to gain power in the current unfair one. It shouldn’t have to be that way, but it is.

Hungarians’ recent success in ousting authoritarian Viktor Orban via elections despite distortions in the ruling party’s favor show that it’s possible. They needed a unified opposition and overwhelming numbers, crushing Orban’s party by nearly 20 points. That isn’t fair, but they pulled it off.

With that in mind, the biggest card pro-democracy Americans currently have is massive turnout in November 2026.

The president’s party usually loses seats in the midterms, and no president has had approval ratings as low as Trump. The 2018 and 2022 midterms show that some Trump supporters don’t vote unless he’s on the ballot. Beyond that, some of his 2024 voters are disillusioned—by ICE, corruption, high gas prices, etc.—and will swing to Democrats or stay home. And the worst economic effects of the energy supply crunch from Trump’s Iran war haven’t hit yet, so sentiment this fall should be even more negative for the president and his party.

High electoral margins can overcome Republicans’ anti-democratic measures. Not in every district or even state—some post-Callais gerrymanders in southern states will shut Black residents out of national representation, which probably can’t be fixed without national power—but enough to gain control of at least one house of Congress.

Winning a majority in the House is the best available way to start checking Trump, using investigatory authority and Constitutional power of the purse. The bigger the electoral margin, the greater symbolic rebuke and institutional strength in the House.

If Democrats win the Senate, even better, though that will be harder since it’s six years from Democrats’ 2020 electoral victory, and this year’s map favors Republicans. But even closing Republicans’ current 3-seat advantage in the Senate would strengthen the minority and put them in a better position for 2028.

Big turnout will also yield important gains at the state level. That’s where Supreme Court-enabled racial gerrymandering will be most directly impactful, since they can shut minorities out of state government entirely. And state gains can be nationally impactful, since state legislatures and state judges are shaping who a state sends to Congress.

America’s pro-democracy opposition is down, but not out. Success is possible under competitive authoritarianism. But you have to really compete.

There’s a persistent myth that President Donald Trump knows what he’s doing. That his actions are strategic, rather than impulsive. That he’s “playing 4D chess” — anticipating, manipulating and generally outthinking opponents. That anything he breaks he can put back together — on terms more favorable to himself — or will keep operating regardless. So don’t worry.

This still-prevalent view has reached its limit with the Iran war, even if many haven’t realized it yet.

Here are three reality checks:

Reality check 1: Economic disruption is already locked in and growing daily.

A good amount of the media coverage has treated the Iran war as another bit of Trump-caused chaos that he can wind down whenever he wants, just as his tariff blitz unsettled markets but things mostly kept functioning regardless. Stock markets are acting that way, too, with the Dow, S&P 500 and Nasdaq all at or near record highs.

But the global economy is already broken and Trump can’t fix it. The earthquake has hit; the ensuing tsunami just hasn’t reached our shores yet.

The last ships…

Read the full article for free at MS.NOW: https://www.ms.now/opinion/trump-iran-war-reality-check

President Donald Trump has the United States stuck in a conflict with Iran, unable to win significant concessions and unwilling to back down in the face of obvious failure. It’s possible the two sides could strike a deal, but if so, the resulting agreement is unlikely to be favorable to the U.S. and could leave Iran in a stronger position than before the war. This problem is of Trump’s own making: In spending years demonstrating that he has no credibility, he has by extension trashed America’s credibility as well.

Credibility gives words power. For words to change others’ behavior, listeners have to believe them. Promises don’t work if the recipients think you’ll break them; threats don’t work if the targets think you won’t follow through.

Domestically, if someone breaks a contract, a counterparty can seek recourse in court and the government will enforce the results. That makes the contract more credible, which makes people more willing to enter into deals. But internationally, all countries have is their word, physical capabilities and patterns of behavior. Trump’s behavior has convinced the world that he cannot be trusted. His word is worthless.

Nowhere is that clearer than in relations between the U.S. and Iran. Trump has…

Read the full article for free at MS.NOW here: https://www.ms.now/opinion/iran-war-strait-hormuz-diplomacy-trump

After threatening to destroy Iranian civilian bridges and power plants, and declaring “a whole civilization will die tonight,” U.S. president Donald Trump backed down, accepting a Pakistan-brokered ceasefire on Iran’s terms. Both sides reportedly agreed to a two-week halt in fighting to allow negotiations, using Iran’s 10-point list of demands as a framework.

Trump launched the war with absolutist goals, talking of regime change, demanding “unconditional surrender,” and saying he would pick Iran’s next leader. When it was clear the regime survived U.S. and Israeli assassinations of top leaders and could exert leverage by blocking shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, Trump escalated bombing, threatened ground invasion, and communicated a list of 15 demands that included Iran forfeiting its nuclear program and immediately reopening the strait. When that went nowhere, he bombed more, destroyed a civilian bridge—likely a war crime—and made genocidal threats. Then he folded.

Negotiations could…

Read the whole article for free in Liberal Currents here: https://www.liberalcurrents.com/trump-surrenders-to-iran/

President Donald Trump reportedly told aides he is willing to end the Iran war while Iran still controls of the Strait of Hormuz, said a closed strait blocking energy shipments is other countries’ problem and told interviewers the strait will “automatically open” when the United States leaves, which will not be “too much longer” because “it’s a total obliteration.”

Stock markets leapt up on the news. But the strait is America’s problem, whether Trump wants it to be or not, and Iran gets a say in how this goes.

The oil and natural gas markets…

Read the full article for free at MSNOW here: https://www.ms.now/opinion/trump-strait-hormuz-iran-war-problem

Before American financial markets opened on Monday, March 23, nearly a month into the U.S-Israeli war on Iran, President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. and Iran have had “very good and productive conversations regarding a complete and total resolution of our hostilities in the Middle East,” and therefore the U.S. would refrain from attacking Iranian power plants as he had threatened last week. Iranian state media portrayed that as the U.S. backing down in the face of Iran’s warnings, and speaker of Iran’s parliament Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf said no negotiations had taken place, claiming that Trump was lying “to manipulate the financial and oil markets and escape the quagmire in which the U.S. and Israel are trapped.”

All sides in this conflict have incentives to lie and spin—psychological warfare, signaling resolve, posturing for domestic audiences, shaping outsiders’ opinions, establishing negotiating positions, etc.—so no one should take either at their word. Outside observers can’t know if any talks really took place, and if so, what happened in them. Pakistan reportedly offered to mediate, and sent Iran a 15-point plan from the U.S. Iran has rejected that offer, according to state media, and it continues blocking the Strait of Hormuz, the choke point at the end of the Persian Gulf through which about 20% of the world’s oil and natural gas usually flows. Missiles are still flying, global energy shortages are worsening, and the U.S. is sending about 2,000 soldiers from the Army’s 82nd Airborne to the Middle East, adding to the 4,500 Marines already in route.

On the competing claims about progress or lack thereof, it looks like Qalibaf’s statement is more accurate, especially the part about Trump manipulating markets. Economic damage is accumulating, and fewer Americans supported the war at the start than any post-WWII U.S. conflict. Gas prices have risen about a dollar per gallon since before the war began at the end of February, creating political liabilities for the president as his party faces a challenging Congressional election this November.

It also looks like there’s been some massive insider trading. 15 minutes before Trump’s announcement, trading in oil and S&P futures spiked to an unusually high volume, with $580 million betting on an oil price decline alone. Then the market opened, oil plunged, stock indices rose, and someone made a fortune.

But is Qalibaf right about the second part, that the U.S. and Israel are trapped? Do America’s leaders want the fighting to stop more than Iran’s? If so, Iran would now be more in control of the war than the militarily superior countries that started it.

Trump could…

Read the full thing for free in Liberal Currents: https://www.liberalcurrents.com/what-if-iran-doesnt-want-the-war-to-end-yet/

The Iran war is exposing President Donald Trump’s unfitness for national leadership. The lie-filled bluster and escalation he relied on to succeed in business and domestic politics aren’t working, and the situation is out of his control. The world is interconnected and other people get a say, including oil companies and energy markets. But Trump never understood that, and since he has no other moves, he’s kept doubling down despite no plausible path to victory, making things worse.

With Venezuela, Trump said he attacked to take oil, equating his personal rapaciousness with national interest. After U.S. special operations forces ousted Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, Trump found the rest of the Venezuelan regime more pliable, including now-interim President Delcy Rodriguez, and told U.S. energy companies to go get Venezuela’s oil.

Except those companies didn’t want it. Which shouldn’t have been a surprise. Venezuela’s oil deposits are dirty, needing considerable refinement, and drilling isn’t profitable unless oil is priced higher than it was at the time. The infrastructure is poor, and U.S. companies would have to spend billions developing it. And the security situation was volatile after the U.S. military overthrew the national leader. Oil is flammable, and platforms would be a target if an insurgency develops.

But apparently it was a surprise to the White House. Trump berated energy executives, but that didn’t work. They won’t throw away money just because he told them to.

With the Iran war, Trump is trying…

Read the whole article for free at MS.NOW here: https://www.ms.now/opinion/trump-iran-war-strait-hormuz-failing-business

Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz in response to the U.S.-Israeli attack means widespread economic disruption. There is reliance on energy through all aspects of the economy. There are also additional oil effects—things like uses for metallurgy processes, for example, different byproducts used for agriculture—and oil is a global commodity, meaning that it is produced in many different places. The United States both imports and exports; it refines products, it drills crude oil, and all of this is on a day-to-day supply chain. So when things get disrupted, there’s a little slack in the system, but really not much, and then the prices go up. A 20 percent supply decline is incredibly disruptive—it means that there is simply not enough oil to go around.

This was the explicit thing that we saw coming. And by “we,” I mean the broad national security community. It is very likely that people inside the military and the national security establishment told this to the White House—whether Trump himself heard it, or didn’t listen, or others tried to tell him, who knows. But this was the exact reason why we said: yes, confront Iran, but in smarter ways, as opposed to this one thing. This is their big leverage—don’t play into it. And now the U.S. has, and it’s not going to clear up soon.

The paragraphs above are an excerpt from a podcast interview on the Iran war, Trump, and the many big implications that I recorded this week with Greg Sargent. You can hear the whole thing for free by searching on various podcast apps for The Daily Blast podcast from the New Republic, or by following this link. Or you can read the transcript here.

“If the U.S. ends up withdrawing” from the Iran nuclear deal, I wrote in March 2017, “it sets the Middle East on a path to two possible futures: (1) A nuclear Iran. (2) War. Both are much worse than the status quo.” Nine years later, America launched a war on Iran.

I knew those were the only two options because nuclear technology is decades old, and the only way to really prevent a country from getting it is if they choose not to. Iran borders nuclear-armed Pakistan, and has a long-running adversarial relationship with nuclear-armed Israel and America—plus the Iranians saw the U.S. negotiate with North Korea, which has nukes, while attacking Iraq, which didn’t—so they have reason to want a bomb. Sabotage, cyberattacks, killing nuclear scientists, and limited military action could set back Iran’s nuclear development, while paradoxically increasing its incentive to establish a deterrent. The only lasting way to prevent Iran from going nuclear was convincing this regime to give it up, or forcibly replace them with a regime that will.

The 2015 nuclear deal, more formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), restricted Iran’s nuclear activities. It was the painstakingly negotiated, highly detailed result of over a decade of diplomacy. The international community, backed by UN Security Council resolutions, sanctioned Iran for years, offering history’s tightest nuclear deal as an alternative. Iran eventually agreed, and the U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Russia, China, and the E.U. all signed. Three years later, Iran was following it—but Trump broke it anyway, saying that “maximum pressure” would get a “better deal.”

It predictably didn’t. Iran was under less pressure than before JCPOA, since most of the world didn’t reimpose sanctions when the U.S. broke an agreement they wanted to keep.

Trump reneging on the Iran nuclear deal closed off the diplomatic path…

Read the full article for free at Liberal Currents: https://www.liberalcurrents.com/international-relations-is-not-a-morality-play-what-to-expect-from-the-war-with-iran/

On Donald Trump’s orders, the U.S. military has massed around Iran, the largest build-up in the Middle East since invading Iraq in 2003. America’s intentions aren’t clear—regime change? damage? coerced negotiations?—as there’s been virtually no public explanation or debate. A bluff to generate leverage and preparation for a real attack look the same until someone starts shooting or backs down.

Trump expressed support for recent Iranian protests and promised “help is on its way,” then did nothing as government forces massacred thousands of people and reasserted control. In a long State of the Union address, he spent little time on Iran, declaring that Iran “will never have a nuclear weapon,” and saying “we’re in negotiations with them, they want to make a deal,” without offering specifics.

U.S. officials have held talks with Iranian representatives, but they’ve gone nowhere, surprising the White House. The New York Times reports, “as American warships and fighter jets mass off its shores, Iran has refused to concede to President Trump’s demands on its nuclear program and weapons — a stance that has bewildered U.S. officials.” Trump envoy Steve Witkoff expressed a similar confusion: Trump is “curious as to why they haven’t... I don’t want to use the word ‘capitulated,’ but why they haven’t capitulated.”

This confusion is unsurprising from people who approach the world as narcissistic, risk-averse bullies.

Trump and Co. seem genuinely surprised when the smaller side doesn’t give in to threats, even though it keeps happening. He recently declared that America would own Greenland, proceeding as if Denmark would hand it over since the U.S. is more powerful. They refused, Trump made more threats, but Denmark and allies deployed troops as a signal of commitment, and Trump backed down. At least for now.

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Trump called it “genius.” That reflected his long-running Russia sympathy, yes, but also indicated he expected it to work. “Putin declares a big portion of the Ukraine — of Ukraine — Putin declares it as independent. Oh, that’s wonderful,” Trump gushed in an interview.

Trump appears genuinely confused that Ukraine didn’t capitulate. After becoming president again, he has tried to end the war by reducing support for Ukraine and berating the Ukrainians to accept the supposed inevitability of Russian victory. It hasn’t worked.

Asked about Ukrainian President Zelensky saying it’s unfair to demand concessions from Ukraine but not Russia, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt snapped that Trump “doesn’t think it’s fair thousands of Ukrainians are losing their lives.” As if Russia aggressively invading means Ukraine should bow down — a remarkable claim from the leaders of a country and political party fond of Revolutionary War slogans such as “give me liberty or give me death” and “don’t tread on me.”

Trump has shown a willingness to use force—including without proper Congressional authorization, against U.S. and international law—but only when it’s short, low risk, with little-to-no follow through.

He bombed Iranian nuclear sites for a few days last year, but only after Israel had been bombing for a week, taking down Iranian air defenses. Then Trump lied that Iran’s nuclear program was “completely and fully obliterated.”

He’s bombed small boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, shooting at people who can’t shoot back. That’s killed at least 148 people, none of whom posed a national security threat, and hasn’t reduced drug trafficking either.

By contrast, the Houthis shot back, and Trump backed down. The Yemen-based, Iran-backed group fired on international shipping in the Red Sea and shot rockets into Israel, claiming solidarity with Palestinians in the Gaza war. Promising to stop it with force, Trump began bombing Yemen in March 2025, declaring that he’d hold Iran responsible for “every shot fired by the Houthis” and they’d face “dire” consequences. The U.S. dropped about $1 billion worth of bombs on Yemen, damaging some targets, killing some people, and losing two fighter jets—which fell into the sea in separate incidents, possibly from their carrier turning quickly to avoid Houthi fire—but failed to end Houthi attacks.

Then in early May, Trump stopped the strikes, claiming he forced the Houthis to make a deal. The group kept attacking Israel, and two months later fired on Red Sea shipping again. In response, Trump did nothing, acting as if it didn’t happen.

That recalls when the U.S. killed Iranian general Qassam Soleimani in Trump’s first term. The impetus was attacks by Iran-backed militias in Iraq, Trump officials claimed killing Soleimani stopped it, but everyone below Soleimani moved up a spot and Iranian support for proxies continued. Militia attacks in Iraq did too, Trump just didn’t talk about it.

Something similar happened in Venezuela. U.S. special forces removed president Nicolas Maduro, but left the rest of the regime intact. There’s minimal follow through, no apparent advancement of U.S. national interests, nor improvement for the Venezuelan people.

Iran poses a bigger version of that problem. Threats won’t make the regime give up its nuclear or missile programs, bombing can’t end them, and removing top leaders probably won’t change things. It’s a bureaucracy full of ideologues, not a personalist dictatorship. You can’t bomb knowledge, and Iran already rebuilt some of the capacity Israel and America damaged last year.

This is a failure of Trump’s own making. The U.S. had a deal curbing Iran’s nuclear program, but Trump scrapped it in 2018, letting Iran out of restrictions in exchange for nothing while promising that “maximum pressure” would get Iran to accept a “better deal.” It didn’t work, and Iran ramped uranium enrichment back up. Iranian officials who argued that the U.S. can’t be trusted got a big “told you so.”

That makes it even harder for Tehran to make a deal, since they cannot trust that American pressure will ease in response. They saw Trump back down from confronting the Houthis, but respond like a stereotypical bully to domestic and international institutions that give in, treating concessions as a sign of a soft target and demanding more.

Iran won’t capitulate under threat, forfeiting major national interests because Trump told them to. His track record suggests he doesn’t have the stomach or strategic foresight for protracted conflict, and will back down if things get difficult, which makes Iranian leaders think they can weather an assault. And they have strong domestic political incentives to resist, fearing that weakness against foreign pressure could fracture the regime or encourage domestic opponents.

That leaves the U.S. choosing between another round of limited bombing that accomplishes little, a bigger campaign to collapse the regime with no apparent plan for what comes after, backing down in embarrassing fashion, or an empty “deal” Trump can lie about that, at best, kicks the can down the road and makes the problem even harder to solve.