The Trump Admin's Stupid, Harmful, But Unfortunately Unsurprising Signal Leak
Donald Trump ran on information security in 2016, got elected, then became the biggest information security risk in U.S. history
The top issue of the 2016 presidential election, the one that changed Donald Trump from a TV loudmouth to a world historical figure, was information security. Hillary Clinton’s private email server and the mere possibility that classified information might have traversed it dominated media coverage and featured prominently in Trump’s attacks. Then he won the election and became the biggest information security risk in U.S. history.
Eight years later and the dumb keeps coming: In a stunning new security lapse revealed Monday, top Trump administration officials included Atlantic editor Jeffrey Goldberg in their group chat on the encrypted messaging app Signal. At one point, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth shared operational details about upcoming U.S. airstrikes in Yemen, and two hours later they happened.
We’re not talking about an embedded mole carefully eluding detection. Trump’s national security advisor, Michael Waltz, sent Goldberg—a personification of establishment media if there ever was one—an invitation. Goldberg says he eavesdropped on the chat for two days. Apparently none of America’s national security leaders or their staffers noticed.
This incident exposes a rich vein of political hypocrisy—all the untold hours of Trump administration officials criticizing Hillary Clinton for her emails—that it is difficult to resist mining. But this latest lapse fits into a disturbing broader pattern, with serious implications for our national security.
U.S. military commanders see easily avoidable leaks like this and worry about operational security. At minimum, when the most senior defense leaders are information security risks, it adds another factor to planning that’s already quite complex.
U.S. intelligence partners see failures like this and conclude America can’t be trusted. They have to operate under the assumption that any sensitive information given to the United States could be accidentally leaked by top officials. Not to mention the possibility that President Trump or longtime Putin sympathizer Tulsi Gabbard, the new director of national intelligence, will give it away to adversaries. The loss of trust damages counterterrorism, insight into foreign governments, and other national security goals.
If these idiots are accidentally roping in the editor of the Atlantic on secret war deliberations, what are the chances they’re making other serious information-security mistakes, including ones that create openings for foreign intelligence agencies? Probably pretty high.
Avoiding problems like that…
Read the full article for free in The Bulwark here:
I'm curious what Nicholas thinks of the suggestion by Sarah Longwell/JV Last and Josh Marshall that this has a broader implication: the group are almost certainly routinely using Signal in order to avoid creating a public record of their discussions about the activities they are engaged in. That would make it difficult to convict them were they ever to be charged for running what appears to be an autogolpe.