The U.S.-Iran Deal is Basically American Surrender
Examining the U.S.-Iran "Memorandum of Understanding" point-by-point
The United States and Iran say they reached a “memorandum of understanding” (MOU) to end the current war and work towards a more comprehensive agreement, but hesitated to release the language to the public. The U.S. also reportedly refused to show the text to the Israeli government, America’s partner in launching the war. Logical inference says that’s because the MOU favors Iran, the Trump White House knows it, and they don’t want to hear criticism, including from more hawkish Republicans.
One U.S. official tried preemptively dismissing the text, telling CNN White House correspondent Alayna Treene that “people shouldn’t read too much into the language of the MOU” because “what’s more important than the actual document is the understandings we have with each other.” But the Iranians almost certainly think the written specifics of the MOU they spent weeks hammering out matter more than things American and Iranian officials might have said to each other off the record. So will regional and world governments.
The text has now leaked, and Trump officials were right to think it makes them look bad. The MOU amounts to U.S. surrender. While the wording might be a little different in the final signed document, in part because it’ll be published in multiple languages, here is the full text as reported by Bloomberg News. Each MOU article is in italics, with my comments below.
1. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States, together with their allies in the current war, declare upon the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding an immediate and permanent end to the war on all fronts, including Lebanon, and undertake that from now on they will not launch any hostile action against each other, and will refrain from the threat or use of force against each other. The final agreement will confirm the articles of this Article and the remaining Articles.
Standard war-ending language when neither side achieved a decisive military victory. Except for one part: “including Lebanon.” The United States is not at war in Lebanon, Israel is. And Israel isn’t a party to the MOU. So the U.S.-Iran agreement depends on the U.S. getting Israel on board, even though the Israelis didn’t participate in the talks.
This gives Israel an opportunity to play spoiler, maintaining or escalating activity in Lebanon to undermine the U.S.-Iran agreement. Though that would risk a breach with the United States, which would be very risky for Israel since many countries are increasingly treating it as a pariah.
But whatever Israel does, including Lebanon in the MOU gives Iran leverage in future talks. The Israelis might scale back military operations, but they’re very unlikely to withdraw from the parts of southern Lebanon they invaded to establish a “buffer zone” with Hezbollah. That means Iran could cite Israel’s actions to scuttle future talks with the United States. Or Iran could strategically ignore Israel’s military activity if they like how negotiations are going.
2. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States undertake to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.
Standard mutual recognition of each other’s sovereignty. Though it’s worth noting that this article, if actually followed, requires more of America than Iran, since the United States has violated Iranian sovereignty considerably more than Iran has violated America’s. (America’s main problems with Iran, such as violation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and ongoing support for terrorism, aren’t about U.S. sovereignty.)
3. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States undertake to negotiate and reach a final agreement within a maximum period of 60 days, extendable by mutual consent.
The U.S. and Iran agree to work towards an agreement. This is effectively an admission of American failure. Trump launched the war calling for regime change and demanding “unconditional surrender,” but the MOU treats the Iranian regime as the legitimate representation of the country, and offers concessions rather than securing anything like surrender.
4. Immediately upon the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding, the United States Lift the naval blockade and prevent any interference or obstruction against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and restore traffic within a maximum of 30 days to its full capacity; the traffic of ships shall be proportional to the pre-war volume of traffic on the part of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States also undertakes to withdraw its forces from the surrounding areas within 30 days after the final agreement.
5. Upon signing this Memorandum of Understanding, the Islamic Republic of Iran will immediately take steps to ensure that the movement of merchant ships from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa is resumed within 30 days to the pre-war volume, taking into account the need for the removal of technical obstacles and the neutralization of mines by Iran.
Together, these articles aim to restore maritime traffic, undoing the blockage that’s causing so much damage to the global economy. But note how the demands on America are immediate and concrete (“immediately upon signing… lift the naval blockade”) while the demands on Iran are not (“take steps to ensure that the movement of merchant ships… is resumed”). Article 4, which lifts America’s blockade, doesn’t include language on legitimate reasons for delay, while article 5, which lifts Iran’s block of Hormuz, acknowledges the possibility of “technical obstacles” and mine removal. By not including specifics, that language gives Iran another excuse if they want to use it.
And what does it mean to “withdraw [American] forces from the surrounding areas”? Move warships further away from Hormuz? Close all military bases in and around the Persian Gulf? Something in between?
The ambiguity plays to Iran’s advantage, similar to the language about an “immediate and permanent end” to war in Lebanon. It won’t actually happen, at least not to the full extent, which means Iran will always have an excuse if they want to stall or exit negotiations. For example, they could do something like “hey America, you promised to withdraw forces but these photos show ongoing activity at this base in Saudi Arabia, you broke the deal.”
6. The United States undertakes, together with its regional partners, to create a comprehensive plan agreed upon by both parties for the rehabilitation and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran, While ensuring financing of at least $300 billion. The implementation mechanism of this plan, as part of the final agreement, will be formulated within 60 days.
Iran gets “at least $300 billion.” A main talking point from Trump and other opponents of the JCPOA—the Iran nuclear deal Obama signed in 2015—was that it gave Iran $1.7 billion as part of the price for verified nuclear restrictions. I’m not a banker, but I’m pretty sure $300B is a lot more money than $1.7B.
The MOU specifies $300 billion as the floor for Iran’s foreign-funded reconstruction, but doesn’t call for Iran to do anything to get it. No nuclear restrictions or verification methods here.
That said, the deal doesn’t give this money to Iran immediately, instead specifying that it will be “part of the final agreement.” The carrot of a large reconstruction fund for Iran gives the U.S. potential leverage in future negotiations. But Iran is very unlikely to forfeit their nuclear program in exchange, especially not when Iran’s position is strong enough to get the concessions in this MOU, so a $300B reconstruction fund might never happen.
And if it does, where will the money come from? Trump has tried spinning this as others choosing to “invest” in Iran, claiming that’s better than the U.S. giving money directly to Iran, which implies that non-U.S. countries will fund it. But if he expects Gulf Arab governments to give billions to Iran even as they spend big to rebuild the infrastructure Iran damaged, he’ll likely be disappointed.
7. The United States commits to ending, on a schedule to be agreed upon as part of the final agreement, all types of sanctions currently facing the Islamic Republic of Iran, including resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and all unilateral U.S. sanctions, both primary and secondary.
Major economic benefits for Iran, though it’s left as leverage for future talks involving Iran’s nuclear program, not given immediately. Iran wants sanctions relief, and will at minimum negotiate in pursuit of it. But it’s worth noting that sanctions relief for nuclear restrictions was the core arrangement of the JCPOA, which Trump reneged on without cause, and still denounces.
8. The Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates that it will never produce nuclear weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States have agreed that the fate of enriched material and the fate of all other mutually agreed nuclear-related issues, including Iran’s nuclear needs, will be adequately addressed in a final agreement; the final agreement will confirm the articles of this Article.
Iran has always insisted it will never produce nuclear weapons. Most of the world thinks that’s a lie (hence all the sanctions) but Iran has kept insisting it. So while the Trump regime may try touting this article, it isn’t a concession at all. The MOU even acknowledges this as Iran’s long-running stance with the word “reiterates.”
9. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States agree that, pending a final agreement, they will maintain the status quo: Iran will maintain the status quo on its nuclear program, and the United States will not impose new sanctions on Iran or strengthen its forces in the region.
This is odd language—maybe it sounds clearer in farsi—but it looks like both sides agreed to remain static while talks take place. That means Iran won’t do any additional nuclear enrichment and the U.S. will not deploy more military assets to the region.
10. The United States undertakes that immediately after the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding, and until the date of the lifting of sanctions, the United States Treasury Department will issue waivers for exports of Iranian crude oil, petrochemical products and their derivatives, and all related services, including banking, insurance, transportation, and the like.
This part is clear, and it’s an immediate concession to Iran. Upon signing the MOU, the U.S. issues waivers to allow Iranian economic activity. If the U.S. removes restrictions on Iranian oil exports and gives Iran access to international financial and insurance services, that’s de facto removal of sanctions, at least for a time. Iran does not have to do anything in exchange.
11. The United States undertakes that, in light of the progress of negotiations towards a final agreement, frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran will be released and made fully available. These funds, whether held in the master account or transferred, will be used for any final beneficiary payment determined by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran and will be fully available for use. The United States undertakes to issue all necessary permits and licenses on this basis.
Another economic concession to Iran, the release of frozen funds. This one isn’t immediate like Article 10, but also doesn’t require the U.S. and Iran to reach a larger deal first. The MOU says the U.S. should unfreeze Iran’s funds “in light of the progress of negotiations towards a final agreement,” which sounds like the U.S. paying Iran to participate in talks.
This provision sets up a debate over what constitutes “progress.” Iran can say there’s been progress, demand some of its unfrozen funds, and threaten to exit negotiations if they don’t get it. The U.S. can say there hasn’t been progress, and Iran needs to show more movement to get its money back. That’s potential leverage for either side, though the strategic dynamic and the talks that led to this MOU show the Trump regime as thirstier for a deal than the Iranians, so it’s probably more leverage for Iran.
12. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States agree that an implementation mechanism will be established to oversee the successful implementation of and future commitment to the Final Agreement.
Sure, fine. Third party oversight could help facilitate implementation.
13. Following the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding, and upon receipt of assurances regarding the commencement of implementation of Articles 4, 5, 10, and 11 of this Memorandum of Understanding, and the continued implementation of these steps, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States will enter into negotiations for a Final Agreement solely with respect to the remaining Articles.
Articles 4, 5, 10, and 11 are the ones where the U.S. makes concessions. Iran got American negotiators to accept a text that emphasizes the U.S. immediately lifting its blockade, withdrawing military forces within 30 days, immediately issuing waivers to facilitate Iranian exports, and committing to unfreeze funds during negotiations rather than after a final deal.
Including this language leaves no doubt that the negotiations are on Iran’s terms, and the United States is effectively surrendering.
14. The final agreement will be approved through a binding resolution of the UN Security Council.
Sure, fine. It’s good to have international buy-in.